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Article 8

Reforming the Enforcement of the Japanese
Antimonopoly Law
Mitsuo Matsushita*

I. INTRODUCTION

As in some major economies, competition policy in Japan has been
revitalized in the past two decades. 1 In recent years, this trend has
accelerated because of the rapid progress of globalization. The 2005
amendments to the Japanese Antimonopoly Law (JAML) contained
provisions that: (1) increased the surcharge imposed on cartels from 6%
of turnover to 10%; (2) made a type of monopolization (control of
business activities of other enterprise(s)) subject to surcharge; and (3)
introduced a leniency program. 2 The 2009 amendments to the JAML
included: (1) a surcharge increase to 15% for ringleaders of cartels; (2) a
surcharge increase to 15% on a party with a record of past violations;
(3) a criminal penalty increase on individuals from the maximum of
three years imprisonment to five years; and (4) the introduction of a
surcharge on certain conduct which falls under unfair business
3
practices.
As the law is more strongly applied, the request for a fair and
objective trial is more strongly voiced. There has been considerable
debate in Japan about the proper role that the enforcement agency, i.e.,
the Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) should play. Some argue that
the JFTC lacks objectivity in enforcing the JAML and that its powers

*

Professor Emeritus of Tokyo University.

1. On historical aspects of the Japanese Antimonopoly Law, see TONY A. FREYER,
ANTITRUST AND GLOBAL CAPITALISM 160-244 (2004). For general accounts of it, see H. IYORI
& A. UESUGI, THE ANTiMONOPOLY LAWS OF JAPAN (1994). This work is a little old and does
not contain recent developments and new cases. This is cited here because there is no
comprehensive work of the Japanese Antimonopoly Law available in the English language, and
this book gives a good general picture of what it looks like.
2. CHIZURU IKEDA, KOBE UNIV., INTRODUCTION TO THE ANTIMONOPOLY LAW 25-27
(2005), http://www.jftc.go.jp/eacpf/O5/jicatext2/08251nt.pdf [hereinafter JFTC Release 2005].
3. JAPAN FAIR TRADE COMM'N, SUMMARY OF THE AMENDMENT TO THE ANTIMONOPOLY
ACT 3-7, 10 (2009), http://www.jftc.go.jp/e-page/pressreleases/2009/June/090603-2.pdf
[hereinafter JFTC Release 2009].
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should be curtailed. 4 Others argue that the independence of the JFTC

from undue interference of politics is essential for fair and candid
enforcement; accordingly, they believe that the existing powers of the
JFTC to hold hearings and decide cases should be firmly maintained.5
As discussed below, the enforcement of the JAML was changed by

the 2005 amendment from a "prior hearing" system to a "post hearing"
system.6 Oppositions have been raised to this new system, however,

arguing that it lacks objectivity and neutrality. In the debates for the
2009 amendment, proposals were made to change the enforcement
procedures of the JAML. However, no agreement was reached among

the interest groups, the JFTC, the Ministry of Economy, Trade &
Industry (METI), and critics, so no change was included on the

enforcement procedures.

The National Diet (legislature) stated in a

resolution attached to the 2009 amendment that enforcement procedures
of the JAML should be reviewed and, during 2009, an appropriate

proposal for improving the enforcement procedures be recommended.
At the time of writing this paper, discussions are underway among
many circles on this subject, and the prospect is not yet certain.
The author had the opportunity to chair a task force on this subject in

2007-2008. This task force was composed of prominent lawyers and
academics in Japanese competition law. It reviewed enforcement
procedures in the United States and Europe, and interviewed foreign

lawyers and business groups such as the American Chamber of
Commerce in Japan (ACCJ) 7 and the Keidanren. It also consulted with

4. This view is represented by the "Keidanren," the Federation of Business in Japan. The
Keidanren is composed of major business associations and represents entire industries in Japan.
The Keidanren has been a major critic of the JFTC and has always played a role opposing the
strengthening of the law. For its position on this issue, see NIPPON KEIDANREN, PROPOSAL FOR
COMPREHENSIVE AMENDMENTS TO THE ANTIMONOPOLY ACT: To ESTABLISH INTERNATIONAL
PARITY INTHE INVESTIGATION AND APPEALS PROCESS (2007), http://www.keidanren.or.jp/
english/policy/2007/091summary.pdf. The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI)
also takes this opposing view. Although the METI has never officially announced its view on
this subject, it is clear from METI officials' comments made at hearings conducted by the
Antimonopoly Law Committee of the Liberal Democratic Party and conferences.
5. This view is strong among academics. They argue that the independence of the JFTC from
political influences and pressures from business is possible only if it has the power to decide
cases independently and according to its own discretion; to deprive it of this power would mean
that the JFrC would be subjected to pressures coming from politicians and businesses. For their
views, see http://www.pluto.dti.ne.jp/funada/0804HP-ikensho-kakuteiban.pdf (translated by
author).
6. See JFIC Release 2005, supra note 2, at 19 (noting that hearings are now initiated when
elimination or surcharge orders are objected to, and the hearings take place as a post-issuance
review procedure).
7. For the ACCJ's view on the JAML, see AM. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE IN JAPAN, ACCJ
PUBLIC COMMENT TO THE JFTC REGARDING PROPOSED REVISION TO THE ANTIMONOPOLY LAW
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officials of the JFTC and the METI. The task force published a report
in 2008 ("Report") 8 in which it recommended certain changes to the
enforcement system of the JAML.
This short paper will describe and analyze major issues in reforming
the JAML enforcement process and the organization of the JFTC, with
reference to the proposals and ideas expressed in the Report.
II. A BRIEF SKETCH OF THE JAPANESE ANTiMONOPOLY LAW
The JAML was enacted in 1947, and the Occupational Forces
proposed it as part of the Economic Democratization Policy. This
policy included the agrarian land reform, labor legislation, the
dissolution of Zaibatsu (large industrial combines which dominated the
Japanese economy before the Second World War as well as during the
War), and the enactment of the JAML. The JAML was modeled after
United States antitrust laws, the only major competition laws effectively
9
enforced at that time.
The JAML provided for the prohibition of three types of conduct: (1)
private monopolization; (2) unreasonable restraint of trade (horizontal
cartels); and (3) unfair business practices. As the enforcement agency
of the JAML, the JFTC was based on the model of the United States
Federal Trade Commission.
As originally enacted, in addition to the three categories of prohibited
conduct, the JAML included provisions for regulating mergers and
acquisitions. Two special laws were also enacted to supplement the
JAML: the Law to Regulate Unreasonable Premium and Unreasonable
Representation and the Law to Prevent Unreasonable Delay in Payment
of Subcontractors and Related Matters. This regulatory framework is
still valid today.
During the first several years, from 1947 to about 1951, the JAML
was strongly enforced and the Occupational Forces supported it.
However, enforcement declined quickly after the conclusion of the
Treaty of San Francisco in 1951, which ended the Occupation, and
stayed dormant until the late 1960s. Since about 1970, its enforcement
has gained momentum for a variety of reasons, including the high cost
of economic infrastructure (construction, banking, etc.), a shift in
emphasis of economic and industrial policies from producers' interests
to consumers' interests, and economic globalization. In this context,
(2004), availableat http://www.accj.or.jp/doclib/pc/040625JFrC-E.pdf.
8. See Competition Law, http://www.jcl.gr.jp (translated by author).
9. On the historical aspects of the JAML, see generally E. M. HADLEY, ANTITRUST IN JAPAN
(1970); FREYER, supra note 1.
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globalization was especially important because Japan's continued
integration into international markets called for convergence of the rules
of conduct for enterprises and, for this purpose, Japan was urged to
0
increase enforcement of its competition law.'
In 1977, an amendment passed which introduced a 2% administrative

surcharge against cartels for the turnover of an enterprise which
participated in a cartel. In 1992, another amendment increased the
surcharge to 6%. The 2005 amendment increased it to 10%, and the

2009 amendment, to take effect in 2010, will raise it to 15% for
ringleaders of cartels and repeat offenders. The 2005 amendment also

introduced a leniency program and this has made JFTC enforcement
more effective in dealing with international cartels. 11 In this way, the
enforcement of the JAML has been revitalized since 1970 and this trend
12
continues today.
III.

THE ORIGINAL ENFORCEMENT PROCESS OF THE JAML

Because JFITC enforcement procedures were modeled after the
United States Federal Trade Commission, the two enforcement schemes
10. During the 1970s and 1980s, the big political and economic issue between the United
States and Japan was a large trade imbalance in favor of Japan. Japan enjoyed a huge trade
surplus in relation to the United States, and this led to political tensions. In 1989-1990, both
governments were engaged in a trade negotiation called "The Structural Impediments Initiative"
("the SII"). In 1990, the SII Report was submitted to both the President of the United States and
the Prime Minister of Japan. This report recommended certain reforms in both countries to ease
the trade tensions. With regard to Japan, the report stated that an important reason for difficulty
of access to the Japanese market on the part of foreign businesses and commodities was anticompetitive conduct on the part of Japanese enterprises. The report recommended that the
Japanese government take steps to invigorate the enforcement of the JAML. Thereupon, the
Japanese government made amendments to the JAML and issued guidelines on distribution
matters and took other measures to strengthen its enforcement. On the SII and its consequences,
see M. Matsushita, The Structural Impediments Initiative: An Example of Bilateral Trade
Negotiation, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 436, 439-49 (1991).
11. JAPAN FAIR TRADE COMM'N, CEASE AND DESIST ORDER AND SURCHARGE PAYMENT
ORDER AGAINST MARINE HOSE MANUFACTURERS 2-3 (Feb. 22, 2008), http://www.jftc.go.jp/epage/pressreleases/2008/February/080222.pdf.
In this case, the JFrC, for the first time,
cooperated with competition law agencies in the United States, the EU, and others, to jointly raid
establishments of the defendants in Japan and hand down a decision holding the international
marine hose cartel unlawful under the JAML. Yokohama Rubber Company, one of the
participants of the cartel, filed a report with the JFTC in accordance with the leniency program.
The company received immunity from penalty not only in Japan, but also in the United States and
the EU. See Stephen Blake, The Marine Hose Cartel: The First UK Cartel Offence Convictions,
COMPETITION LAW INSIGHT, July 29, 2008, at 3. See also Press Release, EUROPA, Antitrust:
Commission Fines Marine Hose Producers C 131 Million for Market Sharing and Price-Fixing
Cartel (Jan. 28, 2009), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/
09/137&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
12. See JFTC Release 2005, supra note 2, at 12, 32-36 (citing the history of Japan's
antimonopoly act).
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contain only minor differences. Besides the administrative procedures
of the JFTC, the JAML established criminal penalties for individuals
and enterprises which participated in private monopolization and
cartels, as well as civil suits for damages by injured parties who allege
that they sustained damage by conduct that violated the JAML. Thus,
there were three ways to enforce the JAML: (1) administrative
procedures before the JFTC; (2) criminal penalty; and (3) private
enforcement. However, the latter two procedures were not used
effectively and, in fact, the JFTC procedures were the main tool for
enforcing the JAML.
Under those procedures, when the JF7C had reasonably available
evidence of a violation, it initiated an investigation. When it was
convinced that a violation had been committed, it issued a
recommendation to the party in violation indicating the facts that the
JFTC found and that the facts constituted a violation. The party to
which such a recommendation was issued had a choice of whether to
accept it. If the party accepted it, the JFTC issued a decision with the
same recommendation without an administrative hearing-a
recommendation decision.
Despite its name, a recommendation
decision was binding on the party to which it was addressed, and noncompliance incurred a criminal liability. If a recommendation was
rejected, then the JFJ7C initiated a formal administrative hearing and
issued a decision based on that hearing. During an administrative
proceeding, a respondent could propose to the JFTC an intention to
settle the case by indicating that it would accept the facts alleged by the
JFTC and the illegality as stated in the complaint; the respondent would
also propose a program to resolve the illegality. If the JFTC agreed
with this proposal, the administrative proceeding was terminated and a
consent decision was rendered. Thus, there were three types of
decisions under the original enforcement procedures of the JAML:
recommendation decisions, administrative hearing decisions, and
consent decisions. It is important to note that, in this system, the major
feature was that the hearing procedures preceded a decision except for
cases in which recommendation decisions were issued.
IV. THE ENFORCEMENT PROCESS UNDER THE 2005 AMENDMENT-THE
CuRRENT ENFORCEMENT PROCESS

Japan's monopoly laws fundamentally changed with the 2005
amendment of the JAML. This Part will explore the specifics of the
amendment and its criticisms.

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 41

A. The Post Hearing System
In 2005, the enforcement process of the JAML was amended. A
procedure was introduced authorizing the JFTC to issue a cease-anddesist order to an alleged violator, requiring it to stop the conduct in
question.
The 2005 amendment also imposes an administrative
surcharge on the alleged violator if the conduct in question belongs to
13
the category in which administrative surcharges must be imposed.
This order is subsequently subject to review by the JFTC.
Under the current procedures, the JFTC initiates an investigation, and
when it concludes that a violation has occurred, it notifies the party in
violation that it will take an adverse action. The JFrC also holds a
summary hearing in which it presents evidence of the conduct in
question and the legal reasons why it constitutes a violation. The
suspected party can present a summary argument advocating its
position. After this summary process, the JFTC issues a cease-anddesist order and an order for administrative surcharge when appropriate.
If a party subject to a cease-and-desist order or administrative
surcharge order is dissatisfied, it can file a complaint with the JFTC.
The JFTC then must open a formal hearing proceeding wherein the
complainant is afforded the opportunity to present facts and legal
arguments that the order was wrongly decided. The JFTC attorneys
who investigated the matter are the respondents in the case, and hearing
examiners conduct the hearing and create an initial draft decision. A
draft decision is presented to the Commission, which consists of five
commissioners including the Chairman, and the Commission renders its
decision after taking into account the draft decision, the records of the
formal hearing, and the objections of the complainant to the draft
decision. A decision of the JFTC can take the following courses of
action: uphold the cease-and-desist or administrative surcharge order;
remand the case back to the investigatory attorneys for reinvestigation;
or reverse it as being wrongly decided.
A decision of the JFTC can be appealed to the Tokyo High Court that
has the exclusive jurisdiction to examine the validity of JFTC orders.
The substantial evidence rule applies here, and the Court is bound by
facts that the JFTC found if substantial evidence supports such facts. A

13. Administrative surcharges must be imposed on cartels that affect prices and
monopolization by way of controlling activities of other enterprises. The JFrC has no discretion
to decide whether or not to impose them. Once the JFrC finds that such conduct occurred, it
must impose an administrative surcharge on the enterprise. The 2009 Amendment adds
monopolization by excluding from the category of required surcharges activities of other
enterprises and certain types of unfair business practices.
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petition can then be filed with the Supreme Court against a decision of
the Tokyo High Court.
B. Criticismsof the Post Hearing Procedureand Proposalsfor Reform
When this enforcement procedure came into effect in 2006,
Keidanren-represented business groups criticized it. Bar associations,
academics, and others also proposed reforms.
The Keidanren argued that the post hearing procedure is unfair
because the same JFTC initiates the investigation, issues the
administrative order, and reviews the order. 14 Due to institutional bias
inherent in the bureaucracy, JFTC hearing examiners and
commissioners cannot be expected to make an objective and candid
judgment on the validity of an order which it itself issued. It argued that
the administrative hearing procedure of the JFTC should be abolished
altogether and replaced by a procedure in which a party who is subject
to a JFTC order is allowed to petition against the order directly in court.
The Keidanren has not yet announced which court would have
jurisdiction to review JFTC orders. Presumably, a district court, which
is a court of first instance, would have jurisdiction over JFTC orders.
A group of academics in the area of competition law has advocated
maintaining the JFTC hearing procedure.' 5 The academics argued that
it is essential to keep a hearing system to safeguard the independence of
decision-making of the JFTC. They noted that the JFTC is the expert
organization in competition law and policy, and as a result, is the most
appropriate entity to make judgment on competition matters. The Japan
Federation of Bar Associations advocates a dual system in which a party
subject to a JFTC order would have a choice of petitioning in court or
6
requesting that the JFTC initiate a formal administrative hearing.'
A resolution of the National Diet attached to the amendment of 2005
stated that the JFTC hearing procedure should be reviewed after two
years, and an appropriate recommendation should be made regarding
possible change in the enforcement procedure of the JAML.
Accordingly, a taskforce was organized within the Cabinet Office.
After a two year deliberation, the taskforce published a report in which
it stated that, although the post hearing system created by the 2005
amendment had operated satisfactorily, in the long run it should be

14.
15.

For its view on the post-hearing procedure, see KEIDANREN, supra note 4, at 1.
See generally KEIDANREN, supra note 4 (discussing Keidanren proposal

comprehensive amendments).
16. For the report of the Federation's position, see http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/ja/opinion/
report/080508_2 html (translated by author).

for

528

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 41

changed back to the "prior hearing" system that existed before the 2005
amendment. 17
The JAML was again amended in 2009 but contained nothing with
respect to the JFTC administrative hearing due to differing views on this
subject and a lack of consensus. However, a resolution attached to the
2009 amendment states that a proposal for a reform of the JFTC
enforcement procedure should be made. 18 At the time of writing this
paper, such a proposal had not been announced.
V. ISSUES REGARDING HEARING PROCEDURES

There are strong criticisms of the current post hearing process in
which the JF7C issues a cease-and-desist order and initiates a formal
proceeding when the party to which the order is directed brings a
complaint against the JFTC. As stated above, critics such as the
Keidanren, who argue against the current system, advocate its complete
abolition. They argue that in the JFTC hearing process, decisions are
likely to be affected by bias no matter how the hearing procedure is
arranged because one division of the JFTC reviews decisions made by
another division of the same agency. In the Japanese context, this
argument is persuasive because the majority of JFTC officials are socalled "career officials" who spend all of their working years at the
JFTC and develop a strong sense of loyalty to the agencies in which
they serve.
These critics argue that after the JFTC has issued a cease-and-desist
order, the respondents in JFTC proceedings should be allowed to
petition to courts directly. In this design, courts of the first instancei.e., district courts-would entertain suits against the JFrC. Advocates
for this position assume that courts are truly independent and will make
objective and candid judgments. However, it is not certain that courts
will make completely impartial and objective decisions. In Japanese
17.

See ADVISORY PANEL ON BASIC ISSUES REGARDING THE ANTI-MONOPOLY ACT, REPORT

ISSUED BY THE ADVISORY PANEL ON BASIC ISSUES REGARDING THE ANTI-MONOPOLY ACT 39-

40 (2007), availableat http://www8.cao.go.jp/chosei/dokkin/kaisaijokyo/finalreport/
finalreport-en.pdf. Although the report states that, in the long run, the current post hearing
system should be converted to a prior hearing system, it does not explain the reasons why this
change should be desirable. Undoubtedly, the taskforce took into account criticisms raised
against the post hearing system by business groups and others and probably implied that there is a
defect in the present post hearing system.

18. The resolution states that the present post hearing system should be done away with but
should not return to the prior hearing system as enforced before the 2005 Amendment. It is not
clear from reading the resolution's text whether it means only that the prior hearing system as
exercised before 2005 should not be revived, or that any prior hearing system should not be
adopted.
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administrative law, a formal decision of an administrative agency is
presumed to be lawful, and courts respect this presumption of
lawfulness. In addition, courts generally lack expertise in competition
law and tend to adhere to JFTC decisions. Accordingly, in the majority
of past cases where decisions of the JFC were subject to judicial
review, courts have generally upheld decisions of the JFTC.
As discussed above, the Japanese Federation of Bar Associations,
together with some economic organizations, argue that a complainant
should be allowed to choose whether to bring a complaint in court or to
request the JFTC to initiate a formal hearing. In this proposed system,
there would be two streams of cases: those that the courts decide and
those that the JFTC decides. Different interpretational doctrines may be
established on the same subject matters; for example, vertical territorial
restraint agreements could be decided by presumptive illegality but also
could be judged by a rule of reason analysis. This dualism, or the
existence of disharmonious doctrines, creates legal uncertainty and
confusion. There is no institutional mechanism through which this
discrepancy can be remedied. It is probably the Supreme Court which
has the final say on any differences of interpretational doctrines;
however, it takes a long time to get a case through to the Supreme
Court. Therefore, it seems that this system will make the enforcement
procedure too complex and cause confusion and legal uncertainty.
The Report advocates a prior hearing system. According to the
Report, a prior hearing system should be introduced in which the JFTC
must initiate a hearing when it is convinced of the existence of a
violation. This process occurs as follows: first, the JFTC designates
investigatory attorneys for a case and the attorneys conduct an
investigation including a dawn raid, an order for production of
documents, and interrogation of suspected persons. Then, upon their
report that the existence of a violation is likely, the JFTC initiates a
formal hearing in which the investigatory attorneys and the suspected
party are positioned in an adversarial way, and both present their
versions of facts and legal claims. Three hearing examiners are named
to deal with the case. They act as arbiters with respect to the dispute
before them and come up with draft decisions that are presented to the
Commission and to the respondents. Finally, the Commission decides
the case after reviewing the draft decisions that the hearing examiners
prepare, any objections that the respondents make, and the complete
record of the case.
This system looks similar to the one before the 2005 amendment.
But considering the criticisms raised against the JFrC procedures, the
Report proposes a number of improvements. The major improvements
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are explained below.
One of the criticisms of the JFTC proceeding is that it takes too much
time. To address this issue, the Report suggests that administrative
regulations should state that a JFTC hearing process should take no
more than one year, and hearing examiners are required to conduct
hearings so that proceedings are completed within this timeframe. A
complaint that the investigatory attorneys present must clearly specify
the subject matters to be dealt with, applicable provisions of law, any
proposed cease-and-desist order, and any surcharge in a case in which a
surcharge must be imposed.
The Report also maintains that hearing examiners should make
judgments independently from the Commission. For this purpose,
although it is the Commission that initiates an administrative hearing,
the Commission refrains from interfering in the hearing process.
Likewise, the Commission should make an independent judgment
and should not be unduly influenced by draft decisions. In the past, the
JFTC almost always adhered to those draft decisions that hearing
examiners prepared. The JFTC cited draft decisions and merely stated
that the judgment of the Commission was the same as that of the draft
decision, and simply referred to the draft decision without stating the
facts and legal assessment of the Commission. This has raised concern
among respondents as to whether the Commission closely examined the
case and came up with an independent decision. In light of this, the
Report recommends that the JFTC should nominate an expert counselor
who advises the Commission when it comes to a decision. The
counselor should be independent from the Secretariat of the
Commission and should not be a member of it. He or she who acts as
the counselor should be selected from outside the JFTC, e.g., from
among eminent lawyers, academics, or ex-government officials who are
regarded as highly reputable persons in their fields. The counselor's
view would not bind decisions of the Commission, but the Commission
must hear views of the counselor before rendering a decision.
This idea derived from the advocate general in the European Court of
Justice. In Europe, the advocate general participates in proceedings,
and its opinions are highly respected. The advocate general does not
represent any of the disputing parties but presents an objective view
with regard to the interpretation of the law. It was thought -that this
system should be introduced into the JFI'C proceeding to maintain
objectivity in judgment.
Another important issue is disclosing documents and information
regarding the case before the JFTC to respondents that are in the hands
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of investigatory attorneys. At present, the JFTC is only required to
disclose documents and information that the investigatory attorneys
acquire if the documents and information are introduced into the
hearing process. Therefore, the investigatory attorneys can withhold
other documents and information from being disclosed to the
respondent if they so decide. The Report advocates a new system in
which a respondent to a JFTC proceeding is given the right, with minor
exceptions, to request any documents and information that investigatory
attorneys acquire through compulsory discovery process.
Investigatory attorneys are given compulsory power to seize any
documents and other information necessary for investigation and order
private parties to produce them.. As discussed below, Article 70-15 of
the JAML states that parties in interest in a JFTC proceeding can
request to review and copy documents that constitute the records of the
case. 19 However, the Supreme Court stated that the records in this
sense include only those documents that the investigatory attorney
submits for the hearing and do not include pieces of evidence that the
investigatory attorneys acquired prior to the initiation of the hearing but
did not submit for the hearing. If the respondent is prevented from
reviewing all of the documents and information gathered by the
investigatory attorneys, the respondent in a JFFC hearing is seriously
disadvantaged due to lack of information. The above system is
advocated to keep a "level playing field." This concept is modeled after
the principle of equality of arms incorporated in regulations of the
European Communities regarding the enforcement of their competition
20
rules.
VI. CONSENT JUDGMENT

As explained above, the original enforcement procedures of the
JAML consisted of: (1) a recommendation issued by the JFTC; (2) a
formal hearing process if the recommendation was rejected; and (3) a
final decision. In the majority of cases, respondents accepted JFTC
recommendations and decisions were rendered without a hearing.
Respondents had the right to reject recommendations and, if rejected,
there would be a formal hearing process. In this way, a prior hearing
was guaranteed if the respondent so wished. Under the current system,

19. 9 Antimonopoly Regulations Act on Prohibition of Private Monopolization and
Maintenance of Fair Trade, Act No. 54, art. 70-15 (1947).
20. Commission Notice on the Rules for Access to the Commission File in Cases Pursuant to
Article 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, Article 53, 54 and 57 of the EEA Agreement and Council
Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004, 2005 O.J. (C 325) 7.
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there is no equivalent option to challenge the recommendation decision.
If the JAML is amended to introduce a new enforcement process that
includes a formal hearing before a JFTC final decision, there would
need to be a mechanism for resolving issues without going through the
formal hearing process, if respondents so desire. In most cases under
the old system, respondents preferred to resolve the problems quickly
without resort to formal proceedings. After closely reviewing consent
judgments as used in the United States, and commitments and
settlements as exercised in the European Communities, the Report
concluded that a U.S.-type consent judgment should be adopted. In
Europe, a settlement is based on admission on the part of respondent to
the facts and illegality as alleged by the Commission, and this
admission could be used in subsequent civil litigation as evidence of the
facts and illegality of the conduct in question.
If an early termination mechanism is to be utilized by enterprises, the
settlement procedure should not involve too much risk of subsequent
civil litigation. For this reason, the Report recommends that a system
similar to the consent judgment system in the United States should be
adopted in which a consent decree does not involve an admission of
facts and illegality on the part of defendant.
For the sake of
transparency and protection of public interests, there should be a
procedure where a draft consent judgment is disclosed to interested
parties and to the public in general for a certain period of time for
comments. This idea is similar to the "competitive impact statement"
that the United States Department of Justice uses.

VII.

INVESTIGATORY PROCESS

In Japan, the rights of the respondent in a JFTC proceeding are not
accorded as much respect as in the United States and Europe. Issues
here include the right to counsel in JFTC proceedings, attorney-client
privilege, early disclosure to respondents of information that
investigators gathered, and immediate disclosure of the records of
interrogation and related matters. The most important among these are
the right to counsel and attorney-client privilege, which are recognized
both in the United States and Europe. The JFTC organized a study
group to prepare for the 2005 amendment and this group
recommended 21 that the respondent's right to counsel in a JFTC
proceeding and attorney-client privilege need not be introduced because
other agencies (police, securities exchange commission, tax office, etc.)

21.

See http://www8.cao.go.jp/chosei/dokkin/kaisaijokyo/finalreport/finareport-en.pdf.
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do not allow these rights to suspects, and to allow such rights only with
respect to a JFI'C proceeding is not congruent with the Japanese
regulatory system. With respect to the right to counsel, the Report
states that the presence of counsel in a JFTC interrogation may delay
the process and invite undue interference on the part of counsel into
JFTC investigations.
This view is hardly tenable because the right to counsel and attorneyclient privilege are universally recognized human rights, and to deny
them only for the reason that other agencies in Japan do not recognize
them would mean that Japan refuses to harmonize its judicial system
with other major countries. For this reason, the Report strongly
advocated the adoption of the right to counsel and attorney-client
privilege in JFTC proceedings. This right to counsel would prevent the
JFTC from ordering production of documents that the attorney-client
privilege covers.
VIII. DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION TO OUTSIDE PARTIES
According to JFTC policy, it must disclose facts gathered through
compulsory investigation to civil courts when civil actions are brought
following JFTC actions. In fact, Article 70-15 of the JAML states that
parties in interest have the right to see and take copies of the records of
JFTC proceedings. It is clear that parties in interest include respondents
at JFTC hearings, but the question is who else would be regarded as a
party in interest. Court decisions interpreting this article indicate that
parties in interest include not only parties in the JFTC proceeding but
also parties who bring a separate and subsequent civil action against the
22
conduct that is the subject matter of a JFTC proceeding.
It seems, however, that the scope of disclosure of information
gathered by the JFTC through compulsory discovery proceedings
should be limited to the parties to that JFTC proceeding, i.e., the
respondents. Too wide a scope for such disclosure may lead to
infringement of the respondent's right of defense in a separate civil
proceeding. The 2009 amendment contains a provision stating that
information that the JFTC holds must be disclosed to courts "unless
22. The Supreme Court had a chance to speak on this issue. See Japan Fair Trade Comm'n,
50 SHINKETSUSHU 739 (Sept. 9, 2003). The case involved bid rigging on the part of construction
companies with respect to a local government's bid of waste disposal facilities. Id. The court
stated that a party who brings a civil suit for the recovery of damage sustained due to a violation
of the JAML against the party which had been held as violating provisions of the JAML should
be regarded as a party in interest in the sense of Article 70-15. The party can request review and
copies of documents submitted by the investigatory attorneys and the respondent to the JFTC
hearing which preceded the civil damage suit. Id.
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there is a legitimate reason not to disclose that information." 23 The
phrase following "unless" provides that the JFTC can refuse to disclose
sensitive information if it decides that it is appropriate to do so. This is
a partial remedy to the situation described above.
Foreign interest groups argue that there is uncertainty whether
confidential information submitted by private parties to the JFTC is kept
strictly confidential and does not leak under current practice. They
argue that, unless confidentiality is absolutely guaranteed, foreign
enterprises will be hesitant to use the leniency program as exercised by
the JFTC and to submit evidence to the JFTFC. 24 For this reason, the
Report advocates that disclosure of information that the JFTC acquired
through the compulsory process should be limited to the parties to the
proceeding and for the specific purpose for which the information was
gathered.
There may be an argument that a private party intending to bring a
civil action against a malefactor is disadvantaged due to insufficient
information regarding the violation in question. After the JFTC has
held that certain conduct violates the JAML, that decision is binding on
the defendant. If any civil proceedings emerge pertaining to that same
conduct, such as a civil court handling a plaintiffs claim against the
defendant for a violation of the JAML, the substantial evidence rule
should apply.
IX. CONCLUSION

As markets of the world become more integrated, there will be the
need to promote convergence of competition laws of major trading
nations. Such convergence, or harmonization, is related not only to
substantive regulations (such as how much merger and acquisition
activity should be allowed or prohibited) but also to enforcement
procedures, because it is through enforcement that substantive
provisions are put into effect. Fairness, objectivity, and transparency of
proceedings are the essential elements of due process of law.

23. See, e.g., JFTC Release 2009, supra note 3, at 17-18 (noting the disclosure requirements
under the revised JAML).
24. For the American Bar Association's view regarding the 2005 Amendment, see H.
STEPHEN HARRIS, JR. ET AL., JOINT SUBMISSION OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION'S
SECTIONS OF ANTITRUST LAW AND INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE JAPAN FAIR TRADE
COMMISSION'S DRAFT RULES ON REPORTING AND SUBMISSION OF MATERIALS REGARDING
IMMUNITY FROM OR REDUCTION OF SURCHARGES IMPLEMENTING THE AMENDED ACT
CONCERNING PROHIBITION OF PRIVATE MONOPOLIZATION AND MAINTENANCE OF FAIR TRADE,

2005 A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRUST & SEC. INT'L L., http://www.abanet.org/intlaw/committees/
business-regulation/antitrust/commentsJFTC.pdf.

